§14 [36-38]

Philosophy is the grounding of truth while simultaneously being deprived of what is true.

Philosophy is the will to return to the beginning of history and thus is the will to surpass itself.

Therefore philosophy, seen from the outside, is merely something decorative, perhaps something that serves to exhibit or teach culture, perhaps also an heirloom whose ground has been lost. The many must take philosophy in that way, precisely where and when it is something needful for the few.

A "worldview" sets experience on a definite path and within a determinate range, and this in such a broad way that it does not allow the worldview itself to come into question; the worldview thereby narrows and thwarts genuine experience. From the standpoint of the worldview, that is precisely its strong point.

Philosophy opens experience but for that reason can precisely not ground history immediately.

A worldview is always an end, mostly a long-protracted end, unknown as such.

Philosophy is always a beginning and requires an overcoming of Itself.

A worldview must forgo new possibilities in order to remain one with itself.

Philosophy can be suspended for a long time and can apparently disappear.

Both have their distinctive times, and both keep themselves within history on utterly different levels of Da-sein. The distinction between "scientific philosophy" and "worldview philosophy" is the last scion of the philosophical bewilderment of the nineteenth century, in the course of which "science" received a peculiar, technical-cultural meaning, while on the other hand an individual's "worldview," as a substitute for the vanished foundation, was still supposed to hold together "values" and "ideals," though it could only do so weakly.

What resides as the last genuine remnant in the thought of "scientific" philosophy (d. the deeper grasp in Fichte and Hegel) is this: to found the knowable, and to build it up, in a unitary and systematic (mathematical) way on the basis of, and in continuation of, the idea of knowledge as certainty (self-certainty). There still lives in this aim of "scientific" philosophy an urge of philosophy itself: to save the matter that is most properly at issue in it from the arbitrariness of the opinion of some capricious worldview and from the necessarily confining and domineering ways of worldview in general. For, even in the "liberal" worldview there resides a dogmatism in the sense that it demands all