we cannot simply bypass the current standing of self-consciousness, in which self-consciousness is more a matter of calculation. The basic experience of inceptual thinking would therefore indeed concern beings in the sense of contemporary human beings, their situation, and thus the "reflection" of humans on "themselves."
This train of thought is not incorrect and yet is untrue. Inasmuch as history and historical meditation bear and dominate the human being, all meditation is also meditation on oneself. The point, however, is that the meditation to be carried out in inceptual thinking does not take the selfhood of humans as given, as something that can be attained immediately by representing the "I" and the we and their situation. For in this way selfhood is precisely not discovered but is definitively lost and distorted (cf. The grounding, 197. Da-sein-domain of what is proper-selfhood).
The meditation of inceptual thinking is, rather, so original that it first asks how the self is to be grounded, in whose domain "we," you and I, in each case come to our selves. Thus it is problematic whether, through reflection on "us" we do find ourselves, i.e., our selves, and consequently whether the projection of Da-sein has anything at all to do with the clarification of "self"-consciousness.
It is indeed in no way settled that the "self" is ever determinable by means of a representation of the ego. Instead, it must be acknowledged that selfhood first arises out of the grounding of Da-sein, a grounding that is carried out as an appropriation of the belonging to the call. Accordingly, the openness and grounding of the self arise out of, and as, the truth of beyng (cf. The grounding, 197. Da-sein—domain of what is proper—selfhood). Neither the differently intended dissection of the essence of the human being nor an indication of other modes of being of this being (all these would in themselves merely serve to improve anthropology) can here bring forth meditation on oneself; instead, the question of the truth of being is what prepares the domain of that selfhood in which humans (we) first come to themselves through historical actions and accomplishments and in the configuration of a people.
To be sure, what is proper to Da-sein, as grounded in selfhood, can at first be indicated transitionally in relation to the previous egological self-consciousness and only in relation to it: Da-sein as in each case one's own [je meines]. In this connection it is to be borne in mind that even this egological self-consciousness assumed through Kant and German Idealism a very different form, one in which there is co-posited an assignment to the "we," to the historical, and to the absolute. Moreover, there is immediately given with Da-sein a transposition into the