I. Prospect [74-76]

uncover a "contradiction" here, since indeed nonbeings cannot "be," are thinking in much too narrow a way with their "non-contradiction" as the measure of the essence of beings.

"Beyng" does not simply mean the actuality of the actual, and not simply the possibility of the possible, and in general not simply being [Sein] understood on the basis of particular beings; instead, it means beyng out of its original essential occurrence in the full fissure. Nor is "essential occurrence" limited to "presence."

To be sure, the essential occurrence of beyng itself (and thereby beyng in its most unique uniqueness) does not allow itself to be experienced arbitrarily and straightforwardly, like a being; rather, it opens itself only in the momentariness of Da-sein's leap in advance into the event (cf. The last god, 255. The turning in the event).

Moreover, no way ever leads immediately from the being of beings to beyng, because the view of the being of beings already takes place outside of the momentariness of Dasein.

On this basis, an essential distinction and clarification can be introduced into the question of being. Such distinction and clarification are never the answer to the question of being but are merely the formation of the questioning, an awakening and clarification of the power to raise this question, one which in each case arises only out of the plight and impetus of Da-sein.

Anyone who asks about beings as beings (ὂν ᾗ ὄν) and thereby, with this approach and directionality, asks about the being of beings is standing in the realm of the very question that guided the beginning of Western philosophy and its history up to its end in Nietzsche. We therefore name this question of being (the question of the being of beings) the guiding question. Its most general form was impressed on it by Aristotle: τί τὸ ὄν; (What are beings?). That is to say, for Aristotle: what is οὐσία as the beingness of beings? Here being means beingness. Expressed at once therein is this: despite the denial that being has the character of a genus, nevertheless being (as beingness) is always and only meant as the κοινόν, the common and thus what is common to every being.

With the question of beyng, on the other hand, the starting point is not beings, i.e., this or that given being, nor is it beings as such and as a whole; instead, what is carried out is a leap into the truth (clearing and concealing) of beyng itself. Experienced and interrogated here at once is what essentially occurs in advance (and also lies hidden in the guiding question), namely, the openness for essential occurrence as such, i.e., truth. Co-asked here is the pre-question of truth. Inasmuch as beyng is experienced as the ground of beings, the question of the essential occurrence of beyng, asked in this way, is the basic question. There is never an immediate, straightforward progression from the guiding question to the