That conditions a stratagem which within certain limits must always accommodate itself at first to the ordinary meaning and must proceed in company with that meaning for a while, in order then to call up at the right moment an inversion of thinking, though one still under the power of the same word. For example, "decision" can and should be meant first of all as a human "act," even if not in the moral sense yet performatively nonetheless, until it suddenly means the essence of beyng itself—which does not mean beyng is interpreted "anthropologically" but just the reverse: it means the human being is placed back into the essence of beyng and is released from the fetters of "anthropology." Likewise, "machination" is at first a type of human comportment, and then suddenly and properly it means the reverse: the essence (distorted essence) of beyng in which the ground of the possibility of "undertakings" is first rooted.
This "reverse" is not simply a "formal" trick in mere words, whereby their meaning is turned around; instead, it is the transformation of human beings themselves.
To be sure, the right grasp of this transformation and especially of the space of its occurrence (i.e., the grasp of its grounding) is most intimately interwoven with the knowledge of the truth of beyng.
The transformation of humankind signifies here a change in its essence, inasmuch as the relation to beings is co-intended in the previously held interpretation (animal rationale) although it is psychologically hidden and misinterpreted there and is not grounded and developed as the essential ground. For that includes "metaphysics" and the asking of the question of the truth of beyng.
In the thinking of being in its historicality, the essential power of the negative and of the inversion comes for the first time into a free domain.
42. From "Being and Time" to "Event"
On this "way," if to keep falling down and getting up can be called a way, it is always and only the same question of the "meaning of beyng" that is asked. Therefore the positions of the questioning are constantly different. Every essential questioning must radically change whenever it questions more originally. There is no gradual "development" here. Even less is there that relation of the later to the earlier according to which the later would already lie enclosed in the earlier. Since everything in the thinking of beyng is directed toward the unique, to fall down is, as it were, the norm here! This also rules out the historiological procedure: to renounce the earlier as "false" or to prove that the