later was "already meant" in the earlier. The "changes" are so essential that their scale can be determined only if in each case the one question is pervasively asked out of its own site of questioning.
The "changes," though, are not conditioned from the outside, by objections. For up to now no objection has become possible, since the question is still not grasped at all. The "changes" arise from the widening abyss of the question of beyng itself, whereby every historiological support is withdrawn from this question. As a result, the way itself certainly becomes ever more essential, not as "personal development" but as the human exertion (in a completely non-biographical sense) to bring beyng itself to its truth in beings.
This is merely a repetition of something that since the end of the first beginning of Western philosophy, i.e., since the end of metaphysics, has to happen ever more decisively, namely, the fact that the thinking of beyng must not become a "doctrine" or "system." It must rather become genuine history and thus what is most concealed.
This occurs for the first time as Nietzsche's thinking; and what confronts us there as "psychology," as self-dissection and dissolution and "ecce homo," along with everything contemporary to that desolate time, has its genuine truth as the history of thinking. In Nietzsche this thinking still first seeks what is to be thought and still finds it in the sphere of metaphysical questioning (will to power and eternal recurrence of the same).
The attempts since Being and Time indeed pose the question more originally, but everything observes a more humble measure, provided comparatives are indeed possible here.
The carrying out of the question of being does not admit of any imitation. Here the necessities of the way are in each case historically first, because they are historically unique. Whether, seen "historiologically," they are "new" and "peculiar" is here not a possible theme for our judgment.
The historical domination of the history of Western thinking is becoming ever more essential, and the diffusion of "historiological" or "systematic" erudition in philosophy ever more impossible.
For the task is not to bring to cognition new representations of beings but rather to ground the being of the human being in the truth of beyng and to prepare this grounding in the inventive thinking of beyng and of Da-sein.
This preparation does not consist in the acquisition of preliminary cognitions, out of which the proper cognitions are then supposed to be inferred at a later time. Rather, preparation means here: paving the way, compelling onto the way—in the essential sense: disposing. Then again, not as if what is thought and what is to be thought were