"morals" and "anthropology" and even grasp these latter anew—precisely with the help of "decision"—in the "existentiell" sense
The danger of misinterpreting Being and Time in this "existentiell-anthropological" direction and of seeing the connections among resoluteness, truth, and Dasein on the basis of moral resolution, instead of doing the reverse, i.e., basing ourselves on the essentially occurring ground of Da-sein and grasping truth as openness and resoluteness as the temporalizing spatialization for the temporal-spatial playing field of beyng—this danger is close at hand and is intensified by the many issues not mastered in Being and Time. Nevertheless, the misinterpretation is chiefly kept in check, even if not fully overcome, by adhering from the start to the basic question of the "meaning of beyng" as the one and only question.
What is here called de-cision then proceeds to the innermost center of the essence of beyng itself and thus has nothing in common with what we understand as making a choice or the like. Instead, de-cision [Ent-scheidung] refers to the sundering itself, which separates [scheidet] and in separating lets come into play for the first time the ap-propriation of precisely this sundered open realm as the clearing for the self-concealing and still undecided, for both the belonging to beyng of the human being as the one who grounds the truth of beyng and the assignment of beyng to the time of the last god.
It is a tenet of the modern era that we think starting with ourselves and that when we think away from ourselves we always encounter only objects. We rush back and forth in accord with this customary way of representation and in its terms explain everything. Thereby we never wonder whether this way might not allow for a run-up to the leap through which we first leap into the "space" of beyng and in this leap reach the decision for us.
Even if we leave behind us the "existentiell" misinterpretation of "decision," we still face the danger of another misinterpretation, although today the latter one is, to be sure, especially easy to conflate with the former.
What has the character of decision, as something pertaining to the "will" and to "power," could be grasped in its opposition to "system" by referring to Nietzsche's words: "The will to system is a lack of integrity" (VIII, 64).19 The clarification of this opposition is by all means necessary, because decision comes to stand opposed to "system," but in a more essential sense than the one in which Nietzsche saw the opposition. To him, "system" is always the object of "system
19. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, in Nietzsche's Werke, Vol. VIn (Großoktavausgabe), Leipzig: Kröner, 1919, p. 64.