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§43 [89-90]


building," of a subsequent classification and ordering. Even if we grant Nietzsche a more appropriate understanding of the essence of system, however, it still must be said that he did not and could not grasp the essence. The reason is that he himself had to affirm for his questioning precisely that understanding of "being" (the being of beings) on the basis of which, and as the unfolding of which, "system" arises: to represent the representedness of beings as anticipatory unification of the objectivity of the object (the essential clarification in Kant's determination of the transcendental). "Order" and clarity (not the ordo of the Middle Ages) are only consequences of the "systematic" not its essence. In the end, it is precisely "system" that belongs to integrity, not only as its inner fulfillment but as its presupposition. Admittedly, Nietzsche means something else by "integrity," just as he does not penetrate to the essence of the modern era with his concept of "system." It is not enough to grasp "system" merely as a peculiarity of the modern era; that can be correct, and yet the modern era might still be grasped superficially.

Nietzsche's words about system have then been readily misused as threadbare justifications of those who lack the power for a thinking able to proceed far in advance and on dark paths. Or at least "system" has been rejected as a marginal product in favor of a "systematics" which indeed merely presents the borrowed form of "scientific" thinking for philosophical thinking.

When "decision" comes to stand in opposition to "system," then the transition from the modern era to the other beginning takes place. Insofar as "system" contains the essential designation for the modern concept of the beingness of beings (representedness), whereas "decision" refers to being [Sein] for beings and not merely beingness on the basis of beings, then de-cision is in a certain way "more systematic" than any system, i.e., de-cision is an original determination of beings as such out of the essence of beyng. In that case, not only "system building" but also "systematic" thinking are easily grounded, i.e., grounded on a guaranteed interpretation of beings over and against the tasks of questioning the truth of beyng and thinking about de-cision.

At first, however, we think of "decision" as something that occurs within an "either-or."

It is advisable to prepare the original interpretation (one that belongs to the historicality of being) of decision by referring to "decisions" that arise out of that de-cision as historical necessities.

All Western thinking has been accustomed for so long (not only in the modern era) to a superficial view of the human being (as animal rationale) that it is difficult now to take words and concepts of an


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger