whether humans still venture a decision at all, or whether they give themselves over to the decisionlessness which our era proposes as the state of "highest" "activity."
All these decisions, apparently many and varied, converge on the one and only decision: whether beyng conclusively withdraws itself, or whether this withdrawal, as refusal, becomes the first truth and the other beginning of history.
What is most difficult and most splendid in the decision in favor of beyng secludes itself through its invisibility. If it ever manifested itself, it would doubtlessly be misinterpreted and thereby remain well guarded from every vulgar touch.
Why must decisions arise at all? If they must, then they are necessities of our era, not only as these determinate decisions but also in general as decisions.
What is decision here? It determines its own essence out of the essence of the transition from the modern era into its other. Does decision thereby actually determine its essence, or is the transition merely an intimation of that essence? Do "decisions" arise because there must be another beginning? And must this latter be because the essence of beyng is itself de-cision and in this unfolding of the essence bestows its truth for the first time in the history of mankind?
It is incumbent on us to say here, perhaps even at length, what the words "truth of beyng" do not mean.
The expression does not mean the "truth" "about" beyng and certainly does not refer to a series of correct propositions about the concept of beyng or to an irrefutable "doctrine" of beyng. If something like that could ever be appropriate to beyng (which is impossible), it would have to presuppose not only that there is a "truth" about beyng but also and above all the kind of essence pertaining to the truth in which beyng comes to stand. Yet from where is the essence of this truth and thereby the essence of truth as such supposed to be determined, if not from beyng itself? And from it not simply in the sense of a "derivation" but rather in the sense of a bringing about of this essence by beyng. That is not something we could have at our disposal through "correct" opinions about beyng, for it pertains exclusively to the concealed moments of the history of being.
The expression also does not mean "true" beyng, for instance in the unclear sense in which we speak of "true," veritable, actual beings. For here again a concept of "actuality" is presupposed and is the measure to which beyng is subjected, whereas in fact beyng not only lends to beings that which they are but also and above all unfolds out of itself, out of its essence, its own proper truth.