88
II. The Resonating [110-112]

according to which every being is explained in its origin as ens creatum, the creator is what is most certain, and beings are the effect of this cause which is most eminently. The cause-effect relation, however, is the most common, rudimentary, and nearest, which all human calculation and lostness in beings have recourse to in order to explain something, i.e., to place it into the clarity of the common and usual. Here, where beings must be the most usual, beyng is by necessity what is afortiori ordinary and indeed the most ordinary

Yet now in truth beyng "is" the least ordinary, and thus beyng has here entirely withdrawn and has abandoned beings.

The abandonment of beings by being: the fact that beyng has withdrawn from beings, and beings have first of all (through Christianity) become mere things made by another being. The supreme being, as cause of all beings, took over the essence of beyng. These beings, formerly made by a creator God, then became the dominion of humanity, inasmuch as beings are now taken only in their objectivity and come under human domination. The beingness of beings thereby fades into a "logical form," into what is thinkable by a thinking which is itself ungrounded.

Humans are so dazzled by objectivity and machination that beings are already withdrawing from them; and withdrawing even more are beyng and its truth, wherein all beings must originally arise anew and appear strange, in order for creating to receive its great impetuses and to create.

Abandonment by being: the fact that beyng is abandoning beings, is leaving them to themselves, and thus is allowing them to become objects of machination. All this is not simply "decline," but is the first history of beyng itself, the history of the first beginning and of what stands in the lineage of that beginning, as well as the history of what is thereby necessarily left behind. Yet even this that is left behind is no mere "negativum"; rather, in ending, it makes appear for the first time the abandonment by being, assuming that the question of the truth of beyng is posed out of the other beginning and thus initiates the encounter with the first beginning.

Then it is clear: the abandonment of beings by being means that beyng conceals itself in the manifestness of beings. And beyng itself is essentially determined as this self-withdrawing concealment.

Beyng is already abandoning beings when ἀλήθεια becomes the withdrawing basic character of beings and thereby prepares the determination of beingness as ἰδέα. Beings then allow beingness to have validity only as something supplemental, which to be sure must become the πρότερον ["first"] and the apriori on the level of measuring up to beings as such.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger