II. The Resonating [115-117]

present and thus conditions everything; it is the un-conditioned, the ab-solute, the ens entium, Deus, etc.

What sort of happening, and of which history, is this abandonment? Is there a history of beyng? And how seldom and how little does this history come to light in a veiled way?

The abandonment by beyng happens to beings and indeed to beings as a whole and thereby also to that being which, as human, stands in the midst of beings and, in so doing, forgets their beyng.

Through a disclosure of the abandonment by being, the resonating of beyng seeks to bring back beyng in its full essential occurrence as event. That bringing back will happen only if, through the grounding of Da-sein, beings are placed back into beyng as opened up in the leap.

56. The continuance of the abandonment by being in the hidden mode of the forgottenness of being

To this forgottenness of being, however, there corresponds the prevalent understanding of being; i.e., the former is as such first completed and hidden to itself through the latter. For this prevalent understanding, what is incontestably true about beyng is:

1. its universality (the "most general," cf. ἰδέα—κοινόν—γένη ["genera"]);

2. its obviousness (unproblematic, since the emptiest and containing nothing questionable).

Here, however, beyng is never experienced as such but is always grasped only in the horizon of the guiding question, i.e., in the horizon of beings: ov n QV and thus in a certain sense rightfully as what is common to all (namely, to beings as "actualities" and as things objectively present). The mode in which here, within the horizon of the guiding question, beyng must be encountered and taken up is at the same time attributed to beyng as its essence. Yet this is indeed only one mode of a very problematic grasp within a still more problematic con-cept [Be-griff].

The innermost ground of historical uprootedness is an essential ground, grounding in the essence of beyng: the fact that beyng is withdrawing from beings and yet lets them appear as what "is" and even as what "is more eminently."

Since this deterioration of the truth of beyng is carried out especially in the most graspable forms of the communication of truth, in apprehension and knowledge, therefore the converse holds: if the uprootedness is to be overcome through a new rootedness, genuine

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) GA 65 by Martin Heidegger