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§56 [117-118]

knowledge and specifically knowledge of beyng itself must come to reign here. In that case, what is again first is to apprehend radically—which primarily means to question into—precisely that essence of beyng, namely, the abandonment by beyng.

Wherein the abandonment by being announces itself:

1. The complete insensibility to the ambiguity in that which is held to be essential; ambiguity as effecting an incapacity and unwillingness to carry through actual decisions. For example, everything that is meant by a people: the communal, the racial, the inferior and lower, the national, the permanent; or, for example, everything called "godly."

2. The disappearance of the knowledge of what is a condition, what is conditioned, and what is unconditional. Idolizing, raising to the level of the unconditioned, the conditions of historical beyng, for instance, of the ethnic with all its ambiguity.

3. The remaining caught up in the thinking and establishing of "values" and "ideas"; therein, without any serious questioning, the structural form of historical Dasein is seen as if it were in something unalterable; corresponding to all this is "worldview" thinking. (Cf. The interplay, 11O. The ἰδέα, Platonism, and idealism.)

4. As a consequence, everything is incorporated into a concern with "culture," and the great decisions such as Christianity are not set forth radically but are avoided instead.

5. Art comes under the subjection of cultural utility, and its essence is mistaken; blindness to its essential core, to its way of grounding truth.

6. Altogether characteristic is the misestimation with respect to the unfavorable and the negative. These are simply thrust aside as "evil," misinterpreted, and thereby diminished; and in this way their danger is increased all the more.

7. Therein appears—quite distantly—ignorance regarding the belonging of the not, of the occurrence of negativity, to beyng itself; total unawareness of the finitude and uniqueness of beyng.

8. That is accompanied by ignorance of the essence of truth; unawareness that, prior to everything true, truth and its grounding must be decided; blind mania for "what is true" with a semblance of serious willing (d. Überlegungen IV, p. 83).

9. Accordingly, the rejection of genuine knowledge and the dread of questioning; the avoidance of meditation; flight into incidents and machinations.

10. All stillness and restraint appear as inactivity, as leaving alone, and as renunciation but are in fact perhaps the most extensive overflow back into the letting be of being as event.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger