3. To what extent they complete the disguising of the abandonment by being.
4. Why Nietzsche's recognition of nihilism could not be grasped.
5. Once the abandonment by being is recognized, what does it reveal about beyng itself? The origin of the abandonment by being.
6. Which paths are necessary in order to experience the abandonment by being as plight?
7. To what extent does that require the transition to the overcoming? (Da-sein)
8. Why, for this transition, does Hölderlin's poetry first become futural and thereby historical?
63. Lived experience
To relate beings as the represented to oneself as the relational center and thus to incorporate them into "life."
Why the human being as "life" (animal rationale) (ratio-representation!).
What can count as actually "being" is only what is or can be the object of a lived experience, what presses forth in the realm of lived experience, what humans can bring to themselves and before themselves.
64. Machination
οὐσία (τέχνη—ποίησις—ἰδέα)
constant presence
ens ereatum
nature
history
causality and objectivity
representedness
lived experience