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§76 [149-150]

(viz., every essential one) and can pursue their research with ever more "reassurance." Thus it now needed only a few years until it became clear to "science" that its "liberal" character and its "ideal of objectivity" are not only perfectly compatible with a political-ethnic "alignment" but are actually indispensable to that. Therefore it must be admitted unanimously, on the part of "science" just as much as on the part of "worldview," that talk of a "crisis" of science was in fact mere babble. The "ethnic" as well as the "American" "organization" of science are both moving on the same path, and the question is simply on which side lie the greater means and powers for a speedier and complete disposability in order to drive the unchanged, and not self -alterable, essence of modern science to its extreme end-state. That "task" might still claim hundreds of years and will ever more definitively exclude any possibility of a "crisis" of science or, in other terms, any essential transformation of knowledge and truth.

11. Every science is rigorous, but not every science is "exact science." The concept of "exact" is ambiguous. In general, the word means: precise, meticulous, careful. In that sense, every science demands "exactness," i.e., carefulness in applying the method so as to adhere to the rigor intrinsic to the very essence of science. But if "exact" is taken in the sense of calculated, measured, and determined numerically, then exactness is a character of a method itself (indeed already a character of the proposal) and is not merely a way of applying a method.

12. If "exactness" signifies the measuring and calculating procedure itself, then the proposition holds: a science can be exact only because it must be rigorous.

13. But a science must be exact (in order to remain rigorous, i.e., to remain science) if its subject area is determined in advance as a domain (the modern concept of "nature") accessible solely to quantitative measurement and calculation and only thus guaranteeing results.

14. The "human sciences," on the other hand, must necessarily remain inexact in order to be rigorous. That is not a deficiency; it is their merit. The carrying out of the rigor of the human sciences is thereby always much more difficult than the carrying out of the exactness of the "exact" sciences.

15. Every science, as positive and individual science, relies for its rigor on cognizance of its subject area, on inquiry into that area, on ἐμπειρία ["experience"] and experimentum in the widest sense. Even mathematics requires experientia, the simple cognizance of its simplest objects and of their determinations in axioms.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger