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§85 [171-172]


85. The originary appropriation of the first beginning means gaining a foothold in the other beginning


The originary appropriation of the first beginning (i.e., the appropriation of its history) means gaining a foothold in the other beginning. This is carried out in the transition from the guiding question (What are beings?, the question of beingness, being) to the basic question: What is the truth of beyng? (Being and beyng: the same and yet fundamentally different.)

This transition, grasped historically, is the overcoming—and indeed the first and the only possible overcoming—of all "metaphysics." Only now can "metaphysics" be known in its essence, and in transitional thinking all talk of "metaphysics" becomes equivocal. The question, what is metaphysics?, situated in the domain of the transition to the other beginning (cf. the lecture connected to Being and Time and to "On the Essence of Ground"), inquires into the essence of "metaphysics" already in the direction of a first acquisition of a vanguard position toward the transition into the other beginning. In other words, it already inquires out of the other beginning. What it makes visible in its determination of "metaphysics" is already no longer metaphysics but, rather, is the overcoming of metaphysics. The aim of this question is not the clarification—which means the perpetuation—of the previous and, moreover, necessarily confused representation of "metaphysics" but is instead the impetus into the transition and thereby into the knowledge that every sort of metaphysics is at an end and must be so if philosophy is to attain its other beginning.

If "metaphysics" is made visible as an occurrence belonging to Dasein as such, that does not amount to a quite facile "anthropological" anchoring of the discipline of metaphysics in the human being; rather, with Da-sein that ground is acquired in which the truth of beyng is grounded. As a result, beyng itself now originally gains its sovereignty, and the position of surpassing beings—i.e., proceeding from beings, specifically as things objectively present and as objects—becomes impossible. And so it is first shown what metaphysics was: precisely this surpassing of beings to beingness (Idea). Yet this determination of "metaphysics" remains inevitably equivocal, inasmuch as it looks like a mere updated version of the previous concept and seems to leave untouched the matter itself. It does leave it so, but since this grasp of the essence of "metaphysics" becomes primarily and entirely a grounding of Da-sein, it denies "metaphysics" every path to any further possibility. To grasp in transitional thinking


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger