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§87 [174-175]


Many signs—e.g., the incipient predominance of the "metaphysics" of Richard Wagner and [Houston Stewart] Chamberlain—indicate that the end of Western metaphysics, an end already carried out creatively and uniquely by Nietzsche, is being covered over anew and that this "resurrection" of metaphysics is once again making use of the Christian churches for its own purposes.



86. What the history of metaphysics provides and thus passes on as still implicit and as unknown to this history


1. beingness is presence

2. beyng is self-concealment

3. beings have the priority

4. beingness is subsequent and for that very reason is the "apriori."

What is contained in all this cannot be grasped as long as the truth of beyng has not become for us a matter of necessary questioning, i.e., as long as we have not grounded the temporal-spatial playing field in whose extensions it is first possible to fathom what has eventuated in the history of metaphysics: the prelude of the appropriating event itself as the prelude of the essential occurrence of beyng. Only if the outlining of those extensions (1-4) of the history of metaphysics succeeds will we grasp that history in its unraised ground. But as long as we take our perspectives from what could become, and had to become, the proper knowledge of metaphysics (theory of Ideas and its variants), we are impelled into the historiological, except if we already understand ἰδέα on the basis of articulations 1-4.



87. The history of the first beginning
(the history of metaphysics)


is the history of metaphysics. It is not the individual attempts at metaphysics, the individual theories, that still tell us something now at the end of all metaphysics; it is "only" the history of metaphysics that does so. But this "only" is not a restriction; rather, it is the demand for something more originary. (Still less may we misconstrue, with the aim of transcending them, the individual forms of "metaphysics" as mere games.) Instead, metaphysics must be taken now, at the end, in a serious way which essentially surpasses every acceptance and transmission of doctrinal fragments, every renewal of standpoints, and every blending and equalizing of many standpoints.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger