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§89 [176-177]


89. The transition to the other beginning


To grasp Nietzsche as the end of Western metaphysics is not a historiological finding that concerns what lies behind us; it is rather the historical inception of the future of Western thought. The question of beings must be brought to its proper ground, i.e., to the question of the truth of beyng. And thinking (representing), which previously constituted the guideline and the horizonal structure of every interpretation of beings, is to be taken back into the grounding of the truth of beyng, i.e., back into Da-sein. "Logic," as the theory of correct thinking, then becomes meditation on the essence of language as the naming that founds the truth of beyng. And as for beyng, hitherto understood in the form of beingness as the most general and most familiar, it now becomes as event the most unique and most alienating.

The transition to the other beginning carries out a division, one that does not in the least run between philosophical movements (idealism—realism, etc.) or even between the stances of different "worldviews." The transition divides the ascent of beyng and the grounding of the truth of beyng in Da-sein from all occurrences and apprehendings of beings.

What is divided is so decisively set apart that it is altogether impossible for there to exist any common sphere of division.

This decisiveness of the transition involves no compromise and no reconciliation but only long periods of solitude and the stillest raptures at the fireside of beyng, although beyng still remains completely thrust aside by the pale and artificial light of the "beings" (the "reality that is close to life") of machination and lived experience.

The transition to the other beginning is decided, and yet we do not know whither we are going, when the truth of beyng becomes true, and whence history as the history of beyng takes its steepest and shortest path.

As the transitional ones of this transition, we must pass through an essential meditation on philosophy itself so that philosophy might attain the beginning from which it can completely be itself again without needing any support (cf. Prospect, 15. Philosophy as "philosophy of a people").


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger