III. The Interplay [183-184]

in a "more temporal" and more existentiell [existenzieller] way, and otherwise would make no difference. Rather, precisely that which in the first beginning could not come into question has now done so: truth itself

Now everything is different and is becoming different. Metaphysics has become impossible, for the truth of beyng, the essential occurrence of beyng, is first and is not merely the "whereto" a transcendence is supposed to attain.

In play here, however, is not only the inversion of the previous metaphysics; with the more original essential occurrence of the truth of beyng as event, the relation to beings also changes (no longer that of ὑπόθεσις ["what is laid down underneath"] and "condition of possibility"—i.e., κοινόν and ὑποκείμενον ["what lies underneath"]).

Beyng essentially occurs as the event of the grounding of the "there" and itself determines the truth of the essence out of the essential occurrence of truth.

The other beginning transforms beyng by leaping into its more original truth.

Western thought, in accord with its beginning, expresses in the guiding question a precedence of beings over being. The "apriori" is merely a veiling of the fact that beyng is taken as something subsequent, and this veiling must dominate, insofar as beyng is opened up within the immediately first accosting of beings by way of apprehending and gathering (cf. in The leap: being and the apriori).

Therefore it should not be surprising, but must be expressly grasped as a consequence, how beings themselves within a definite interpretation then become the paradigm for beingness. Despite, indeed even on the basis of, the precedence of φύσις and the φύσει ὄν ["natural beings"], it is precisely the θέσει ὄν ["posited beings"] and the ποιούμενον ["produced things"] that become what now supplies the apprehensional interpretation with something understandable and now determines (as ὕλη-μορφή ["matter-form"]' cf. the Frankfurt lectures of 19363) the understandability of beingness itself (cf. The interplay, 97. Φύσις (τέχνη)).

Therefore what stands in the background and immediately with Plato assumes special prominence is τέχνη as the basic character of knowledge, i.e., the basic character of the fundamental relation to beings as such.

Does not all this indicate that indeed even φύσις must be interpreted in correspondence with the ποιούμενον of ποίησις (cf. ultimately Aristotle) and that φύσις is not forceful enough to summon up

3. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes." In Holzwege (GA5).

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger