by itself its own truth, beyond παρουσία and ἀλήθεια, and to bear the development of this truth?
Yet that is what the other beginning seeks to accomplish and must accomplish: the leap into the truth of beyng in such a way that beyng itself grounds being human and indeed not directly and immediately but instead only as a consequence of the dependence on Da-sein and as this very dependence.
The first beginning is not mastered, the truth of beyng, despite its essential lighting up, is not explicitly grounded. That means: a human anticipatory grasp (of assertion, of τέχνη, of certainty) becomes the guideline for the interpretation of the beingness of beyng.
What is needed now is the great inversion, one beyond all "revaluation of values," an inversion in which beings are not grounded on the human being, but humanness on beyng. That, however, requires a higher power of creating and questioning and at the same time a deeper readiness for suffering and enduring in the entirety of a complete transformation of the relations to beings and to beyng.
The relation to beyng can now no longer remain within a corresponding repetition of the relation to beings (διανοεῖν—νοεῖν—κατηγορεῖν ["predicating"]).
Because that inceptual anticipatory grasp in the comportment of apprehending (νοῦς—ratio) takes the human being out into beings, so that on account of such anticipation a highest being is thought as ἀρχή ["origin"]—αἰτία ["cause"]—causa—the unconditioned, it then seems as if this were not a drawing down of being into the human. That anticipatory grasp provided by thought in the first beginning, as the guideline for the interpretation of beings, can indeed be understood from the other beginning as a kind of non-mastery of the still non-experience able Da-sein (cf. The grounding, 212. Truth as certainty).
In the first beginning, truth (as unconcealedness) is a character of beings as such, and according to the transformation of truth into the correctness of assertion, "truth" comes to determine beings as transformed into objects. (Truth as correctness of judgment, "objectivity," "actuality"—the "being" of beings)
In the other beginning, truth is recognized and grounded precisely as the truth of beyng and beyng itself precisely as the beyng of truth, i.e., as the intrinsically turning event to which pertain the inner falling-apart of the fissure and thus the abyss.
The leap into the other beginning is the return to the first, and vice versa. Yet the return to the first beginning ("re-petition") is not a transposition into something past, as if this could be made "actual" again in the usual sense. The return to the first beginning is rather, and precisely, removal from it, the occupying of that remote position