What the confrontation does show, however, is that the previous interpretation of beings has lost all necessity and can no longer experience or compel a need for its "truth" or for the way it leaves unasked even the truth about itself. For, since Plato, the truth of the interpretation of "being" has never been questioned. Representational correctness and its validation in intuition were merely carried over from the representation of beings back to the representation of the "essence"; last of all in pre-hermeneutical "phenomenology."
95. The first beginning
The concealment of the inceptual must be safeguarded above all. Every distortion of it through attempts at explanation must be avoided, since by necessity an explanation never attains the beginning but merely drags it down to the explanatory level.
in a double, convoluted sense of "present") forms the open realm out of which beings as beings (being) possess truth. In correspondence with the greatness of the beginning, "time"—either as itself or as the truth of being—is never deemed a worthy object of questioning and experience. And just as little is it asked why time comes into play, for the truth of being, as the present and not also as the past and future. What thus remains unasked conceals itself as such and allows inceptual thinking to recognize only the uncanniness of emergence, the uncanniness of the constant presencing of beings in the open (ἀλήθεια), as that which constitutes essential occurrence. Essential occurrence [Wesung] is understood as presencing [Anwesung] though is not explicitly grasped as such.
That to us, out of the first beginning and in a retrieving meditation, time appears primarily as the truth of beyng does not mean that the original, full truth of beyng could be grounded only on time. Indeed at first there must on the whole be an attempt to think the essence of time so originarily (in the temporal "ecstases") that time becomes graspable as possible truth for beyng as such. Yet this thinking of time already brings it, through relatedness to the "there" of Da-sein, into essential relation with the spatiality of Da-sein and thereby with space (ct. The grounding). Compared to their usual representations, however, time and space are in this case more originary and are entirely time-space, which is not an interconnection but something more originary in the belonging together of time and space. This something points to the essence of truth as the clearing-concealing. The truth of beyng is nothing less than the essence of truth, grasped and grounded as