III. The Interplay [193-194]

Then, in general, becoming as change of presencing, changeover, μεταβολή, the broadest concept of κίνησις, "motion."

Motion as the presencing of the changeable as such

Aristotle is the first to conceptualize the essence of motion in the specifically Greek way in terms of constancy and presence (i.e., in terms of οὐσία), and to do so he must explicitly bring into the account the κινούμενον ["moving thing"] as such.

For this, however, already presupposed is the interpretation of beings as εἶδος-ἰδέα and thus as μορφή-ὕλη; i.e., presupposed is τέχνη, which is essentially related to φύσις.

Thus results motion as completedness, as the essence of presencing, keeping itself in the domain of manufacturing and finishing.

Motion must not be understood here in the modern sense as locomotion in time; even the Greek φορά ["motion with respect to place"] is not that.

For, in this modern determination, motion is viewed in terms of the moving thing, and the latter is understood as a spatio-temporal, punctual mass. The task, however, is to grasp motion as such as a mode of being (οὐσία). The essential difference between the metaphysical and physical understanding of motion can be seen most clearly in terms of the concept and essence of rest.

Physically, rest is standstill, stoppage, absence of motion; thought and calculated quantitatively: rest is a limit case of motion, its limit in the vector of decrease.

Metaphysically, however, rest is in the genuine sense the highest concentration of movedness, concentration as the simultaneity of possibilities in fulfilled and most constant readiness.

An ens "actu" is precisely a being at "rest," not in "action" but, rather, concentrated into itself and in that sense fully present.

Because we customarily take beings in terms of this "actual" actuated acting [von diesem "wirklichen" gewirkten Wirkenden], we constantly overlook the basic characteristic of rest in the essence of "beings" as "actualities." E.g., we take a thing as an object, but who has considered that this thing is precisely resting and that such is even a preeminent rest?

On account of this overlooking of the "metaphysical" rest in beings as such, it happened that beingness was altogether misapprehended and that one took "substance" as satisfactory, and that people later found themselves dissatisfied with this concept as something that was not grasped and were compelled to undertake an even more unsatisfactory "overcoming" of it.

In this regard, what does the inceptual emphasis on ὄν as "unmoved" versus "change" signify? And from this point of view, what does Plato's

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger