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§100 [194-196]

interpretation of the κινούμενον as μὴ ὄν signify, despite the fact that κίνησις belongs among the highest γένη of ὄν, according to the Sophist?

What is accomplished by the clarification of motion in terms of δύναμις ["possibility"] and ἐνέργεια ["actuality"]? And where does its later, non-Greek misinterpretation lead


100. The first beginning8


In the first beginning, beings are experienced as φύσις and are so named. Beingness as constant presence is still veiled therein: φύσις as prevailing emergence.

The fact that beingness was grasped as constant presence from ancient times counts already for most people as a ground already, if they ever do ask about grounds. But the early and inceptual character of this interpretation of beings does not immediately constitute a ground; quite to the contrary, it makes the interpretation all the more problematic. An appropriate inquiry will show that the truth of beingness is not asked about at all. For the thinking distinctive of the first beginning, the interpretation is ungrounded and cannot be grounded, and rightly so, if to explain by leading back to another being (!) is understood as constituting a grounding

Nevertheless, this interpretation of ὄν as φύσις (and later as ἰδέα) is not entirely ground-less, though its ground (Le., its truth) is indeed hidden. It could be argued that the experience of impermanence, of coming to be and passing away, had suggested and called up as a counter-measure the positing of constancy and presence. Yet how is it that things which come to be and pass away count as nonbeings? Indeed that happens only if beingness is already determined as constancy and presence. Therefore beingness is not read off from beings or from nonbeings; rather, beings are projected upon this beingness in order to first show themselves in the open realm of this projection as beings or nonbeings.

Whence and why is the opening of beingness always a projection? Whence and why is this projection a projection of beings upon time (itself not understood)? Are both of these interdependent? (Ecstatic time and projection grounded as Dasein).

That the truth of beyng remains concealed, although beingness is placed in it ("time"), must be grounded in the essence of the first



8. Cf. The interplay, 110. The ἰδέα, Platonism, and idealism; cf. the debilitation of φύσις.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger