In between, there are scattered single advancements. An example is Schelling's disquisition on freedom, which admittedly can lead to no decision, as the transition to "positive philosophy" shows
105. Hölderlin—Kierkegaard—Nietzsche
No one today may be so presumptuous as to consider it a mere coincidence that these three had to come to an untimely end, they who, each in his own way, at last suffered most deeply the uprootedness to which Western history is driven and who at the same time surmised their gods most intimately.
What is being prepared?
What is involved in the fact that Holderlin, the earliest of these three, also becomes the one who poetized the furthest ahead at a time when thinking once again aspired to an absolute knowledge of the entire previous history? (Cf. Überlegungen IV, p. 115ff.)
What hidden history of the much-invoked nineteenth century occurred here? What law of motion of what is to come is being prepared here?
Must we not now turn our thinking around to very different domains and measures and ways to be, in order that we might still belong to the newly dawning necessities? Or does this history remain inaccessible to us as a ground of Dasein, not because it is past but, on the contrary, because it is still too futural for us?
106. The decision with regard to all "ontology" in carrying out the confrontation between the first and the other beginning
In the transition to the latter from the former, meditation on "ontology" is necessary, so much so that the thoughts developed in "fundamental ontology" must be thought through. For in it the guiding question is for the first time grasped as a question, elaborated, and made visible in relation to its ground and in its structure. A mere rejection of "ontology," without an overcoming of it out of its origin, accomplishes nothing whatsoever beyond endangering every will to thinking. For, such rejection (e.g., in Jaspers) takes a very questionable concept of thinking as its paradigm and then discovers that, through this thinking, "being"—meant in great confusion are beings as such—is not attained at all but is merely wedged into the framework and cast of that concept. Behind this remarkably superficial "critique" of "ontology" (a critique which rambles on and on while muddling up being and beings