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§107 [205-206]

to the highest degree), nothing else is in effect than the distinction between form and content. This distinction is not at all interrogated with regard to its origin and yet is carried over "critically" to "consciousness" and to the subject and its "irrational" "lived experiences." Thus what is here in effect is the Rickert-Lask type of Kantianism, which Jaspers, e.g., has never shed, in spite of everything.

Versus such a "critique" as a simple rejection of "ontology," it must be shown why the latter became necessary (predominance of Platonism) within the history of the guiding question. Conversely, an overcoming of ontology therefore requires in the first place precisely an unfolding of ontology out of its beginning, in contrast to the superficial acceptance of its doctrinal content and the calculation (Nicolai Hartmann) of its strengths and shortcomings. All of that remains superficial and thus surmises nothing whatever of the thoughtful willing which in Being and Time seeks a way of transition from the guiding question to the basic question.

Every ontology (whether fully developed as such or still inchoate) is like the history of the first beginning in asking about beings as beings and in this respect—only in this respect—asking about being. Therefore every ontology proceeds into the domain of the basic question (How does being essentially occur? What is the truth of being?), though of course without surmising this basic question as such and without ever acknowledging beyng in its highest question-worthiness, uniqueness, finitude, and strangeness.

To be shown: how the development of ontology into onto-theology (cf., for example, lecture course on Hegel 1930-3110) confirms the final suppression of the basic question and its necessity and how in this history Nietzsche completes the creative end.


107. The answer to the guiding question and the form of traditional metaphysics


In accord with the Platonic interpretation of beings qua beings as εἶδος—ἰδέα and of the ἰδέα as κοινόν, the being of beings becomes altogether the κοινόν. To be the "most general" becomes the essential determination of being itself. The question of the τί ἐστὶν ["what it is"] is always the question of the κοινόν, and thereby is given for the entire thinking of beings as such the framework of highest genus (highest universality) and specification. The main realms of beings are



10. Lecture course, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, winter semester 1930-31 (GA32).


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger