§110 [210-211]

b) as the κοινόν and κοινωνια in relation to διαλέγεσθαι ["discussing"] and λόγος

c) as the ἀγαθόν—καλόν ["good—beautiful"] in relation to ἔρως, ["love"].

7. Because the essence of beings is in this way gathered in the ψυχή, the latter itself is the ἀρχή ζωῆς, ["origin of life"], and ζωή is the basic form of beings

Here, as also in Aristotle, ψυχή does not mean subject; accordingly, something essential is posited with this relation of ὄν as οὐσία:

a) beings as such are always the over and against, i.e., ob-jects,

b) what is over and against is itself what is constantly present, constantly at hand, and is in the most eminent sense; its being does not need to be questioned

8. The ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας as ἀρχή τοῦ ὄντος ["origin of beings"] possesses, inasmuch as it is the measure of εὐδαιμονία, the character of the θεῖον ["divine"] and θεός ["god"]; cf. Aristotle

The question of beings as such (in the sense of the guiding question), i.e., ontology, is thus necessarily theo-logy.

9. This unfolding of the first end (in Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy) of the first beginning makes it possible that this PlatonicAristotelian philosophy and, in its form, henceforth Greek philosophy in general could then provide the framework and foundation for Judeo-Christian (Philo-Augustine) faith and from this point of view could even be taken as a forerunner of Christianity, precisely as the "paganism" that has been overcome.

10. Not only do Christianity and its "world"-interpretation have here their framework and the predelineation of their constitution, but so do all post-Christian, anti-Christian, and non-Christian Western interpretations of beings, human beings included. The ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας as ἀγαθόν (which means the fundamental renunciation of any further, original questioning into beings as such, i.e., into being) is the prototype for all interpretation of beings and of their determination and configuration in the framework of a "culture." Moreover, it is the prototype for reckoning in accord with cultural values, for the interpretation of "reality" in terms of its "meaning," for the appraisal of "ideas" and the measuring up to ideals. It is the prototype for the forming of an ἰδέα, for a view of beings as a whole, a view of "the world," i.e., it is the prototype for worldview. Where "worldview" determines beings and dominates, Platonism is at work in an undiluted and unrecognized way; and Platonism becomes all the more tenacious when it has gone through the modern reinterpretation of the ἰδέα.

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger