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III. The Interplay [214-215]

the first appropriate interrogation of history but also the last, and last possible, interrogation of that kind.

On the whole, what has followed has been important scholarship, but basically—i.e., philosophically—it amounts to helpless and distracted blather whose unity derives only from the succession of the philosophers and of their writings or "problems."


That which pertains to the concept of "idealism"13


1. the ἰδέα as the presencing of the "what" and as the constancy of such presencing (but this is not grasped and incurs forgottenness, and through misinterpretation it becomes the ens entium as aeternum!);

2. νοεῖν (λόγος), but not yet fixed in the "I"—instead, ψυχή, ζωή;

3. nonetheless predelineated thereby: the perceptum (what is represented, what can be brought before oneself, what is present) of a percipere, which is ego percipio as cogito me cogitare; the co-representing of oneself as that to whom something is represented and that in whose sight and countenance the look of something appears

4. representedness of an ob-jectivity [Gegen-ständlichkeit], and "self" (I)-certainty as the ground of objectivity, i.e., the ground of beingness (being and thinking).


*


15. In the sense of the strictly historical concept of "idealism," Plato was never an "idealist." Rather, he was a "realist," which does not mean that he did not deny the external world in itself. It means instead that he taught the ἰδέα as the essence of ὄν, the realitas of the res. Yet "idealism," precisely in its modern guise, is indeed Platonism, inasmuch as modern idealism also maintains that beingness must be grasped in terms of "representing" (νοεῖν), i.e., (under Aristotelian influences) in terms of λόγος as διανοεῖσθαι ["thinking through"]. i.e., in terms of thinking, which according to Kant is the representing of something in general (categories and the table of judgments; categories and the self-knowledge of reason for Hegel). All in all: the paradigm for the entire history of Western philosophy, Nietzsche included: being and thinking. Although Nietzsche experiences beings as becoming, he is an opponent who still remains inside the traditional framework with this interpretation; beings are simply interpreted differently, but the question of being is never posed as such.



13. Cf. Übungen, summer semester 1937, Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung: Sein und Schein.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger