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III. The Interplay [217-218]

being which (needlessly and excessively adding to the confusion) is also called "being" ["Sein"]!

b) Transcendence in the "ontological" sense refers to the surpassing that resides in the κοινόν as such, namely, beingness as the general (γένη—categories—"beyond" and "prior to" beings, apriori). Here the relation and the type of distinction remain very unclear; one is satisfied with ascertaining the κοινόν and its consequences.

c) Transcendence in the sense of the "fundamental ontology" of Being and Time. Here the word "transcendence" receives again its original meaning: the surpassing as such, grasped as the distinctive feature of Da-sein, indicating thereby that Da-sein in each case already stands in the open realm of beings. Connected up to this one and thereby determined more precisely is "transcendence" in the "ontological" sense, inasmuch as the transcendence pertaining to Dasein is grasped originarily and precisely as an understanding of being. Now, however, since understanding is in turn taken to be thrown projection, transcendence means to stand in the truth of beyng, of course without at first knowing this or questioning it

Because Da-sein as Da-sein originally endures the open realm of concealment, we cannot in the strict sense speak of a transcendence of Da-sein; in the sphere of this determination, the representation of "transcendence" in every sense must disappear.

d) This representation does find frequent employment in "epistemological" considerations. Beginning with Descartes, these deny that the "subject" can immediately go out of itself and transcend itself to attain the "object," or else they cast doubt on this relation. The introduction of Da-sein overcomes even this type of "transcendence," for it is thus bypassed right from the start.

e) "Transcendence" always involves departing from known and familiar "beings" and going out in some way beyond them. From the perspective of the basic question of the truth of beyng, that amounts to a remaining mired in the mode of inquiry of the guiding question, i.e., in metaphysics.

Yet all metaphysics is overcome in the transition to the basic question.

This transition, however, must therefore meditate all the more clearly on the forms of Platonism that still hem it in and are unavoidable, even if they determine the transition only as forms which are to be averted.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger