and seen. Accordingly, there is more in the first beginning than in the Platonic interpretation. In the confrontation the first beginning must therefore be placed back into its unadulterated greatness and uniqueness; the confrontation does not sublate it but instead first grounds its necessity for the other beginning.
26. The overcoming of Platonism in this direction and style is a historical decision of the greatest proportions and at the same time is the founding of a different sort of philosophical history of philosophy in comparison to Hegel's. (What is developed in Being and Time as "destruction" is not a dismantling in the sense of a demolishing. It is a purification aimed at laying bare the basic metaphysical positions. Yet all of that is mere prelude with respect to the carrying out of the resonating and interplay.)
27. In the first beginning and in its history, the truth of being as well as the ground of this truth remain hidden, and that demands, on the part of an originary re-asking of the question of being, a transition to the basic question, how does beyng essentially occur? And only that question can allow us to ask in a renewed way, what are beings?
The most extreme and at the same time most insidious scion of "idealism" emerges where idealism seems to be renounced and even combated (where, e.g., German Idealism is accused of being far removed from life). This scion of idealism takes the form of biologism, which by its very essence is necessarily ambiguous and wants to be such. For the proposal of "life" as the basic reality ("life" as the totality of life and also as human "life") assures us of two main things: Life as acting and doing is a going-further and a going-on and so is directed beyond itself to "meaning" and "value," which signifies that it is an "idealism." But, it can immediately be retorted, an "idealism" not of the lifeform of representation and "consciousness" but of lived experience and acting, i.e., living and experiencing; all this sounds "realistic" and can even allow itself at any time to count, if necessary, also and precisely as the highest idealism.
These ambiguities give the impression of breadth and depth but are merely the consequences of the utter groundlessness of this "thinking" which in a completely superficial way, and while purposely closing its eyes to its own historical provenance, falsely turns what is tangible into the highest, in order to gain the dubious advantage of finding immediate approbation.