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§117 [229-230]

What is wholly other of the other beginning, versus the first. can be made clear through a saying that seems merely to play with an inversion; but in truth everything is transformed.

In the first beginning, being (beingness) is inventively thought (through νοεῖν and λέγειν), envisioned, and posited in the open realm of its essential occurrence so that beings might show themselves. In the wake of this beginning, being (beingness) then becomes a ὑπόθεσις or, more precisely, the ἀνυπόθετον ["what is not hypothetical"] in whose light all beings and nonbeings come to presence. In this way, beyng reigns for the sake of beings. But this basic relation now undergoes two interpretations which then join together and intermix: "being" as summum ens becomes the causa prima of beings, each of which is understood as ens creatum, and being as essentia or idea becomes the apriori of the objectivity of objects.

Being becomes the most common, the emptiest. the best known, and at the same time what is most eminently as that cause, "the absolute."

In all the variations and secularizations of Western metaphysics, this can be recognized again: being in service to beings even if, as cause, being would seem to be the master.

In the other beginning, however, beings are such as to bear the clearing into which they themselves come to stand, and this clearing essentially occurs as the clearing for the self-concealing, i.e., for beyng as event.

In the other beginning, all beings are sacrificed up to beyng, and only from there do beings as such receive their truth.

But beyng essentially occurs as event, the site of the moment of decision regarding the nearness and remoteness of the last god.

Here, in the ineluctable usualness of beings, beyng is the most unusual; and this strangeness of beyng is not a mode of its appearance but is beyng itself.

In the grounding domain of the truth of beyng, i.e., in Da-sein, the uniqueness of death corresponds to the unusualness of beyng.

The most frightful jubilation must be the dying of a god. Only the human being "has" the distinction of standing in front of death, because the human being is steadfastly in beyng: death the highest testimony to beyng.

In the other beginning, the truth of beyng must be ventured as grounding, as inventive thought of Da-sein.

Only in Da-sein does beyng attain the grounding of that truth in which all beings exist solely for the sake of beyng, beyng which lights up as the trace of the path of the last god. The grounding of Da-sein transforms the human being (seeker, preserver, steward).


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger