184
IV. The Leap [233-234]

Even in its very formulation, however, the basic question has a completely different character. It is not a continuation of Aristotle's formulation of the guiding question. For it arises immediately out of a necessity stemming from the plight of the abandonment by being, an occurrence essentially co-conditioned by the history (and by the misunderstanding) of the guiding question.

The displacement into the essence of beyng and accordingly the asking of the precursory question (the question of the essence of truth) are different from all objectification of beings and all immediate access to them, whereby either the human being is altogether forgotten or else beings, as the certain, are referred to the "I" and to consciousness. On the other hand, the truth of beyng and thus the essence of truth essentially occur only through steadfastness in Dasein, through the experience of thrownness into the "there" out of belonging to the call of the event.


*


In order for this wholly other questioning, as constancy in Da-sein, to rise up at all to a decidable possibility, there must first be attempted, specifically starting with the guiding question and through its complete unfolding, a transition to the leap into the basic question; there can never be attempted an immediate transition to the basic question. It needs to be made clear that and why the question of the truth (meaning) of beyng remains unasked in the guiding question. This unasked question is the basic question, seen within the purview and on the path of the guiding question and seen only by way of an indication; time as the truth of beyng; beyng experienced in the first beginning as various forms of presencing.

Being and Time is the transition to the leap (the asking of the basic question). Therefore, as long as this attempt is accounted a "philosophy of existence" ["Existenzphilosophie"], everything remains uncomprehended.

"Time" as primordial temporality Signifies the originary unity of the self-clearing and self-concealing transporting and provides the most proximate ground for the grounding of Da-sein. This approach does not mean that the previous form of the answer is to be retained or even replaced; thus, it is not that instead of "ideas" (or their distortion in the nineteenth century) and "values," other "values" or even no values at all are to be posited. Instead, "time" (and, in correspondence, everything included in the term "existence" ["Existenz"]) has here a completely different kind of meaning, namely, that of the grounding of the open site of the moment for the historical being of humans. Because all decisions hitherto in the realm of "ideas" and "ideals" ("worldviews," cultural ideas, etc.) are no longer decisions, since they no longer question their


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger