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§120 [234-235]

space of decision and still less interrogate truth itself as the truth of beyng, therefore meditation must first be turned to the grounding of a space of decision; i.e., before all else the plight of the lack of a sense of plight, the abandonment by being, must be experienced. But where everything in the domain of "culture," "ideas," "value," and "meaning" retains its previous sense, even though modified by superficial borrowings from the "philosophy of existence," there the abandonment by being is entrenched anew (viewed from within the historicality of being and inceptual thinking) and the lack of a sense of plight is, in a manner of speaking, raised to a principle.

Nothing is surmised here of the incomparability of the basic position in the other beginning, namely, that the leap, now as the question of the essence of truth itself, first brings the human being into the arena of the sudden occurrence and remaining absent of the gods, their advent and absconding. It is only this that the other beginning can will. Reckoned in the previous manner, that signifies renunciation of validity and of applicability in the sense of a "world-view" or "doctrine" or proclamation.

Not a proclamation of new doctrines to the bemired bustling about of humans; instead, a dislodging of humans out of the lack of a sense of plight and into the most extreme plight, namely, the plight of lacking a sense of plight.

120. The leap


If we knew the law of the advent and absconding of the gods, then we could begin to grasp something of the sudden occurrence and remaining absent of truth and thus something of the essential occurrence of beyng.

Beyng is assuredly not—despite a view that has long been customary in the declining realm of the first beginning—the most general property of beings and thus their emptiest determination, as if we already knew "beings" and the task were merely to abstract that "general" feature.

Nor is beyng some immense being, one which would cause all the other, presumably known "beings" and would encompass them in this way or that.

Beyng essentially occurs as the truth of beings. Regarding them a decision is in each case already made through the essential occurrence of beyng, even if that essential occurrence is grasped ever so roughly and obliquely. Therefore the decision about truth is in every respect made with the leap into the essential occurrence of beyng.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger