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§137 [258-259]


137. Beyng


In the other beginning, the essential occurrence of beyng itself must be apprehended as the inceptual and in its full strangeness with respect to beings. Beings themselves are then no longer what is familiar, from which beyng could be delineated as their mere vaporous residue, as if beyng were simply the not yet grasped and most general determination of otherwise known beings

In the other beginning, there is carried out the extreme transporting from "beings" as supposedly setting the standard, no matter how much (cf. the abandonment by being) they might still dominate all thinking.

Beyng is here not a supervenient genus, not an added cause, not something that encompasses beings by standing behind and over them. If that were the case, beyng would be degraded to the level of an addendum, whose accessory character would not be undone by any elevation to "transcendence."

Beyng or, rather, its essential occurrence-out of which and back into which beings as beings first come to be in a concealed and sheltered way (d. The grounding, on truth).

The question of the difference between being and beings has here a character that is totally unlike anything in the domain of the guiding question (the domain of ontology). The concept of the "ontological difference" merely preparatory, transitional from the guiding question to the basic question.

The truth of beyng, in which and as which the essential occurrence of beyng conceals itself in opening itself, is the event. That is at the same time the essential occurrence of truth as such. In the turning of the event, the essential occurrence of truth is likewise the truth of the essential occurrence. This reciprocity itself belongs to beyng as such.

The question of why there is at all truth as clearing-concealing presupposes the truth of the "why." But both, truth and the "why" (the call for a grounding), are the same.

The essential occurrence is the truth itself, which belongs to beyng and arises from beyng.

Only where, as in the first beginning, the essential occurrence appears merely as presencing, does there occur an immediate separation between beings and their "essence," and that is precisely the essential occurrence of beyng as presence. There by necessity the question of beyng as such, i.e., the question of its truth, cannot be experienced and asked.