Therefore in fact not what is ours; rather, the fact that we endure the self as it is opening up, and in the self (cf. The grounding) the to-itself and thereby beyng as event open themselves in a concealed way.
Accordingly, not "we" the starting point, but "we": as exposed and dislodged, though in forgetfulness of this dislodging.
If in this way the event shines into selfhood, then residing therein is the direction toward intimacy.
The more originally we are ourselves, then all the further are we already set out into the essential occurrence of beyng, and reciprocally (cf. the essential occurrence of beyng—the reciprocal grounding of being and Da-sein).
The "ground" of intimacy is open only if the bedrock of questioning is assumed here. This bedrock what is decisive. Beyng nothing "human" in the sense of a human dominion, and yet the essential occurrence of beyng needs Da-sein and hence also needs the steadfastness of the human being.
145. Beyng and nothingness
In the entire history of metaphysics, i.e., in all previous thought, "being" is always grasped as the beingness of beings and hence as these beings themselves. Today still, for every "thinker" the identification of being with beings is something that precedes, so to speak, and the reason is indeed an incapacity for drawing distinctions on the part of all philosophy.
Accordingly, nothingness is always grasped as a nonbeing and thus as negativum. If "nothingness" in this sense is even posited as a goal, then "pessimistic nihilism" is consummated, the disdain for every effete "philosophy of nothingness" is legitimated, and, above all, one is exempted from any questioning, while the "heroic thinkers" are distinguished precisely by their promoting of this exemption.
There is not the least in common between all this and my questioning of nothingness, which arises out of the question of the truth of beyng. Nothingness is neither negative nor a "goal." Instead, it is the essential trembling of beyng itself and therefore is more than any being.
The fact that the proposition from Hegel's Logik, "Being and nothingness are the same," is quoted in "What is Metaphysics?" [Was ist Metaphysik?] signifies—and can signify only this—a general agreement with regard to bringing together being and nothingness. For Hegel, however, "beyng" is not only a determinate, first stage of what is to be thought in the future as beyng, but this first stage, as the