IV. The Leap [266-268]

un-determined and un-mediated, is already precisely the pure negativity of objectivity and of thinking (beingness and thinking).

As difficult as it will be for the future to extricate itself from "metaphysical" thinking, just as inaccessible to it will at first be "nothingness," which is higher than everything "positive" and "negative" in the totality of beings.

Thoughtful questioning must first have attained an original power to say "yes," which resides essentially beyond all optimistic bravado and all programmatic heroism, in order to be strong enough to experience as the most concealed gift the nihilating in beyng itself, which alone genuinely un-settles us into beyng and into its truth. Then we will indeed recognize that nothingness can never be reckoned, or balanced, against beyng, e.g., as what is to be shunned or denied, because beyng (i.e., nothingness) is the "between" for beings and for divinization and can never become a "goal."

146. Beyng and non-beyng11

Because the "not" belongs to the essence of beyng (ripeness as the turning in the event; d. The last god), beyng likewise belongs to the "not." In other words, what has genuinely the quality of the "not'" is the negative and is in no way whatever mere "nothingness" as the latter is grasped through the representational denial of something, on the basis of which denial one then says: nothingness "is" not. But nonbeyng essentially occurs, and beyng essentially occurs; nonbeing essentially occurs in the distorted essence, beyng essentially occurs as permeated with negativity .

Only because beyng essentially occurs in this manner does it have nonbeing as its other, for this other is the other of itself.

Insofar as beyng essentially occurs as permeated with negativity, it at the same time makes possible and compels otherness.

Whence the extreme restriction here to the one and to the other and thus the either-or?

Out of the uniqueness of beyng there follows the uniqueness of its appertaining "not" and thus the uniqueness of the other.

The one and the other compel for themselves the either-or as first

But this apparently most general and emptiest distinction has to be recognized as one that is such only for the interpretation of beingness as ἰδέα (being and thinking!): something (arbitrarily and in general)

11. Cf. The leap, 144. Beyng and the original strife; d. Prospect, 47. The essence of decision.

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger