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§148 [268-269]

and the not-something (nothingness); the "not" likewise representationally groundless and empty.

Yet this apparently most general and emptiest distinction is the most unique and most fulfilled decision. Consequently a presupposition for it can never be, without self-delusion, an indeterminate representation of "beyng," if indeed there is such a representation; instead, beyng as event.

The event as the hesitant self-withholding and therein the ripeness of "time," the mightiness of the fruit, and the greatness of the bestowing, but in the truth as clearing for self-concealing.

The ripeness is gravid with the original "not," ripening not yet a bestowing, no longer both in the oscillation. All this itself withheld in the hesitation, and thus the captivating in the transporting. Here first the essential occurrence of the negative in beyng as event.



147. The essential occurrence of beyng
(the finitude of beyng)


What does it mean that being "is" in-finite [un-endlich]? The question cannot at all be answered, unless included in it is also the question of the essence of beyng.

And the same applies to the proposition that being is finite, if infinity and finitude are taken as concepts relating to objectively present magnitudes. Or is a quality intended thereby? Which one?

Ultimately, the question of the essential occurrence of beyng stands outside of the conflict between those propositions. The proposition that beyng is finite is only intended to avert provisionally every sort of "idealism."

The conflict of those propositions would require saying that if beyng is posited as infinite, then it is in fact determinate. And if posited as finite, then its abyssal character is affirmed. For in-finity can certainly not be meant in the sense of endless flowing and straying but, instead, as a closed circle! On the other hand, the event stands in its "turning"! (conflictually).



148. Beings are


That "proposition" does not immediately say anything. For it simply repeats what is already expressed by the word "beings." The proposition says nothing, as long as it is understood immediately (to the extent that that is even possible), i.e., as long as it is thought in a thought-less way.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger