And so the decision with regard to every sort of sheltering is momentarily reserved for us; in other words, what is reserved is that which we pass by in our passing away.
153. Life
Since every living thing is organismic, i.e., bodily, it is possible to take this bodily thing as a body-object and then consider it mechanistically. There even are certain tasks which require such a view, such as the measurement of size and weight (to be sure, such measurement immediately stands within the horizon of an interpretation of living beings).
The question remains as to whether what can be done in such a (mechanistic) way ever leads to what, first and foremost, must be done, assuming that a fundamental relation to living beings is necessary. To what extent is that the case? What are plants and animals to us, apart from their use for our sustenance and adornment?
Are living beings what is effortless? Something like that would be most difficult to see if everything is directed toward effort and toward its overcoming and if everything moves within machination!
Can there be "biology" as long as the fundamental relation to living beings is unclear, as long as the living being has not become the other resonance of Da-sein?
But must there be "biology," since it derives its justification and its necessity from the sovereignty of science within modern machination? Will not every biology necessarily destroy "living beings" and thwart a fundamental relation to them? Must this relation not be sought completely outside of "science"? In what space should this relation abide?
"Living beings," like everything that can be objectified, will offer scientific progress endless possibilities and yet will also withdraw more and more, the more groundless becomes science itself at the same time.
154. "Life"15
a "mode" of the beingness (beyng) of beings. The initial opening of a being toward itself in the preservation of the self. The first darkening in
15. Cf. The leap, 152. The levels of beyng; cf. biologism in The interplay, 110. The ἰδέα, Platonism, and idealism, p. 173f.