i.e., the connection between resoluteness (openness) and death, i.e., the running-ahead. Yet this running ahead toward death is not to be made visible for the sake of attaining mere "nothingness," but just the opposite, so that openness for beyng might be disclosed—fully and out of what is most extreme.
It is quite to be expected that if these issues are not thought in terms of "fundamental ontology" and with a view toward grounding the truth of beyng, the worst and most absurd misinterpretations will insinuate themselves and spread. A "philosophy of death" will then naturally be devised.
The misinterpretations of precisely this section of Being and Time are the clearest signs of the still-rampant incapacity to reenact the questioning prepared there, which always means to think it more originally and to surpass it creatively.
The essential context for the projection of death is the original futurity of Dasein within its very essence (as that essence is understood in fundamental ontology). In the framework of the task of Being and Time, this primarily means that death is connected to "time," which in turn is established as the domain of the projection of the truth of beyng itself. This already shows, clearly enough for anyone who wants to participate in the questioning, that there the question of death stands in an essential relation to the truth of beyng and stands only in that relation. Accordingly, death is not taken there, and is never taken, as the denial of beyng or even, qua "nothingness," as the essence of beyng. Instead, the exact opposite is the case: death is the highest and ultimate attestation of beyng. Yet that can be known only by one who is capable of experiencing and co-grounding Da-sein in the authenticity of selfhood. This authenticity is of course not meant in a moral-personal sense but, ever and again, in terms of "fundamental ontology" alone.
162. Beyng-toward-death
is to be grasped as a determination of Da-sein and only as such a determination. Enacted here are the ultimate measuring out of temporality and thereby the move into the space of the truth of beyng, the indication of time-space: thus not in order to deny "beyng," but rather in order to establish the ground of its complete and essential affirmability.
Yet how pathetic and cheap it is to latch onto the term "being-toward-death" and explain it as a crude "worldview," one which is then laid to the charge of Being and Time. It seems that this reckoning works especially well, since the "book" indeed also speaks of "nothingness" in many other places. Hence the facile conclusion: being-toward-death,