226
IV. The Leap [287-288]

Essence as essential occurrence is never merely representable; instead, it can be grasped only in the knowledge of the temporality-spatiality of truth and of its respective sheltering

The knowledge of the essence requires Da-sein and is itself the leap into Da-sein. Hence this knowledge can never be acquired through a mere general consideration of the givens and of their already established interpretation.

The essential occurrence does not reside "above" beings, separated from them; instead, beings stand in beyng, and it is only in beyng, standing therein and lifted out, that beings have their truth as the true.

Insofar as everything "categorial" and "ontological" falls on the "side" of beingness, the "differentiation" between beyng and beings, along with everything grounded on that differentiation, must now also be posited and grasped in unity with this concept of essential occurrence



166. Essential occurrence and essence19


grasped as the coming to pass of the truth of beyng. Beyng cannot be conferred back onto the essential occurrence, for this latter would itself then become a being. The question of the being of the essence is possible and necessary only within the postulation of the essence as the κοινόν (cf. the later question of universals). However the question of being is answered, the "essence" itself will always be debased.

The concept of "essence" depends on the way of asking the question of beings as such, i.e., the question of beyng, and, in unity with that, on the way of questioning the truth of philosophical thought. Also in the question of truth, the turning imposes itself: essence of truth and truth of essence.

If we ask about the "essence" along the customary line of questioning, then we are asking about what "makes" a being into that which it is and, therefore, about what constitutes its quiddity, about the beingness of beings. "Essence" is here merely another word for "being" (understood as beingness). Accordingly, "essential occurrence" means the event, insofar as the event appropriates that which belongs to it, namely, truth. The coming to pass of the truth of beyng—that is essential occurrence; thus essential occurrence is not ever a mode of being that supervenes upon beyng or that even, as something in itself, stands above beyng.

This mode of questioning only apparently brings questioning genuinely forward (beings—their being—and then the being of such



19. Cf. Prospect, Inceptual thinking


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger