§193 [311-313]

what is proper" [Eigen-tum, "property"], understood in analogy with "domain of a prince" [Fürsten-tum, "principality"], the sovereign center of the appropriating eventuation as the assignment, of the ones who belong, to the event and at the same time to themselves: becoming a self.

Thus Da-sein is the between: between humans (as grounding of history) and the gods (in their history).

The "between": not one that simply results from the relation of the gods to humans; rather, one that first grounds the time-space for such a relation, in the sense that it itself springs from the essential occurrence of beyng as event and in the sense that, as self-opening center, it makes the gods and humans decidable for one another.

192. Da-sein

To the usual view directed toward "beings," Da-sein, as grounding the openness of self-concealing, appears as nonbeing and imagined. In fact, Da-sein, as the projecting-thrown grounding, is the highest reality in the domain of imagination, assuming we understand the latter not simply as a faculty of the soul and not simply as something transcendental (cf. Kant book), but as the event itself, wherein all transfiguration oscillates.

"Imagination" ["Einbildung"] as an occurrence of the clearing itself. Yet "imagination," imaginatio, is a name that names from the viewpoint of the immediate apprehending of ὄν and of beings. Calculated in those terms, all beyng and its opening constitute a formed image [Gebilde] that is added to what supposedly stands on its own. But all this is inverted: what is "imagined" in the usual sense is always the so-called "really" present at hand, for that is what is brought to an image, i.e., brought into the clearing, into the "there," so as to appear.

193. Da-sein and the human being

The essence of the human being has long been determined with respect to components: body, soul, spirit. There are different ways the components are said to be arranged, to interpenetrate, and to have priority over one another. What likewise changes is the role assumed at any time by one of these "components" as the guideline and point of reference for the determination of the rest of beings (e.g., consciousness in the ego cogito or reason or spirit or, for Nietzsche, the "body" or the "soul," according on his intention).

Cf. λόγος (but not as subject and soul) and νοῦς, in Pre-platonic philosophy and ψυχή in Plato and Aristotle (ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς, ἐστιν

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger