249
§193 [314-315]

approach remains, in sundry variations, up to Hegel and Nietzsche; the turn to the "subject" does not change anything essential. Correlatively, the "body" is seen as a mere adjunct or substrate and is always determined only in contrast to the soul, or in contrast to the spirit, or in contrast to both soul and spirit.

Never does it come to the point of taking the being of human beings as so interpreted, and specifically in their role as guideline for the truth of beings, and of determining and interrogating the being of humans on the basis of this truth in order to gain sight of the possibility that here in the end human being undertakes, with regard to being, a task which dis-lodges it from itself and into that which is question-worthy, Da-sein.

Da-sein does not lead out of beings and does not make beings evaporate into immateriality. It is just the opposite: in accord with the uniqueness of beyng, Da-sein first opens up the restlessness of beings, whose "truth" is endured only in the renascent battle over their sheltering in what is created through historical human beings.

What we, steadfast in Da-sein, ground and create and, in creating, allow to advance toward us in the manner of an assault-only that can be something true and manifest and, consequently, recognized and known. Our knowledge extends only as far as the steadfastness in Da-sein reaches out, and that is the power of sheltering the truth into configured beings.

The Kantian critique of pure reason, which once again (since the time of the Greeks) takes an essential step, must presuppose this nexus without being able to grasp it as such and, afortiori, without being able to bring it to a ground (the reciprocal relation of Dasein and being). Because this ground was not grounded, the critique remained groundless and had to lead soon to a development beyond itself, which was carried out partially with its own means (the transcendental mode of questioning), a development toward absolute knowledge (German Idealism). Because it became absolute here, spirit had to involve in a concealed way the destruction of beings and the complete suppression of the uniqueness and strangeness of beyng and had to hasten that fall into "positivism" and biologism (Nietzsche) which has been entrenching itself more and more up to this very hour.

The present "confrontation"—if it at all deserves to be called such—with German Idealism is merely "re-active" and absolutizes "life," in all the indeterminateness and confusion that can lurk in that noun. The absolutizing is not only a sign of determination by the opponent; it is above all an indication that a meditation on the guiding question of metaphysics is operative there even less than in the opponent (cf. The interplay, 110. The ἰδέα, Platonism, and idealism, especially p. 167f., Hegel).


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger