V. The Grounding [315-317]

Thus we also see the reason the question of truth, which Nietzsche seems to pose out of an original power of questioning and deciding. is precisely not posed by him at all. He merely explains truth biologically, altogether out of a basic position in "life." That is, Nietzsche bases himself on the traditional interpretation of beings as constancy and presence and explains truth purely as a means of securing the continuance of life.

To answer the second question we raised earlier, it must be said:

If Da-sein comes into play (and it must do so whenever beings as such come into question, whereby so does the truth of beyng, al· though in a concealed way), then we must examine what becomes visible as the guideline when conceived thoroughly and universally in correspondence to the inceptual interpretation of beings as constant presence. This guideline is "thinking" as the representing of something in general; here it is a matter of the highest generality, so that this thinking is the most extreme representing.

The trace of Da-sein is visible in representing, namely, with respect to the transport of Da-sein toward something. As a character of Da-sein, representing is a standing out into the open realm, whereby this standing out is concealed to itself and the open realm is interrogated just as little as are the essence and ground of the openness.

Furthermore, representing is a standing out which at the same time remains behind in the soul as a process and act of this soul, and the soul itself, as an "I," ultimately forms that which is over and against the object.

Correctness, as an interpretation of the open realm, becomes the ground of the subject-object relation.

Yet inasmuch as what represents also represents itself, this standing out is merely reiterated and taken back into that which represents, and what remains hidden is precisely what distinguishes Da-sein, namely, to be the "there," the clearing for self-concealment, in the steadfastness of selfhood as grounding of the truth in beings.

If now, finally, representing is drawn into "life," then the Original character of representing as a matter of Da-sein is completely covered over. Representing itself is appraised only according to its use-value, and such appraisal also attributes to representing the sense which it alone can claim as "knowledge" over and against "action."

It seems unsurmountably difficult to find, out of such a representing (appearing) of the world, a foothold for making Da-sein experienceable and visible, especially since the presupposition for everything, i.e., the power to question and the will to clarify, must be dispensed with. How is the highest question of being supposed to become a question in this wasteland!

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger