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§197 [319-321]

comes to be taken as the essence of the "self." Yet in this way, or in any variant of it, the essence of the self will never be reached

For, in the first place, the self is not a property of an objectively present human being, and only semblantly is the self given with I-consciousness. The provenance of this semblance can be clarified only on the basis of the essence of the self.

Selfhood, as the essential occurrence of Da-sein, arises out of the origin of Da-sein. And the origin of the self is the domain of what is proper. This term taken in analogy with "domain of a prince." The reigning of appropriation in the event. Appropriation [Eignung] is at once assignment [Zu-eignung] and consignment [Übereignung]. Inasmuch as Dasein is assigned to itselfas belonging to the event, Da-sein does come to its self, but never as if the self were already an objectively present item that simply had not previously been reached. Rather, Da-sein comes to itself first precisely when the assignment to the belonging becomes at once a consignment into the event. Da-sein: enduring of the "there." The domain of what is proper, as the reigning of appropriation, is the occurrence of the intrinsically conjoined assignment and consignment.

Steadfastness in this occurrence of the domain of what is proper first enables one to come to "oneself" historically and to be with oneself. And only this "with oneself" is the sufficient ground for truly taking on the "for others." But this coming to oneself is most definitely never a previous, detached representation of the I. Instead, it is the acceptance of the belonging to the truth of being; it is leaping into the "there." The domain of what is proper, as the ground of selfhood, grounds Da-sein. Yet the domain of what is proper is itself, for its part, the enduring of the turning in the event.

The domain of what is proper is thus at the same time, by way of Dasein, the ground of restraint.

The relation back which is named in the terms "self," to "itself," with "itself," and for "itself" has its essence in appropriation.

Now, inasmuch as the human being, even in the abandonment by being, still stands in the open realm of the distorted essence of beings, the possibility is always given to be for "oneself," to come back to "oneself." But the "oneself" and the self which is thereby determined as merely something self-same remain empty and are filled only out of what is objectively present and lying there and at the moment dealt with by the human being. The to-oneself has no decisional character and is without knowledge of the bond to the occurrence of Da-sein.

Selfhood is more originary than any I or thou or we. These are as such first gathered in the self and thereby become each respective "self."

Conversely, the dispersal of the I, the thou, and the we, as well as their crumbling and massing together, are not simple human failures;


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger