Ἀλήθεια continues to be understood as accessibility and manifestness (δηλούμενον), and what remains uninterrogated therein, apart from concealment in particular, is openness as such.
Thus, even if the term ἀλήθεια can still be claimed, here what is other must be seen and pondered, despite a deeper historical nexus.
II. Openness is:
1. originally the manifold-unitary, not only that "between" (ζυγόν) for the perceptible and the perceiving; not only something multiple and diverse. Instead, openness must be interrogated as this unity.
2. Not only perception and cognition, but every sort of comportment and attitude, and especially what we are calling disposition, belong to openness. The latter is an occurrence, not a state.
3. the open realm as opened up and self-opening, the encompassment, the dis-closure.
210. Concerning the history of the essence of truth
Since Plato, ἀλήθεια as the illumination in which beings as such stand, the visibility of beings as their presence (ἀλήθεια καὶ ὄν). Also as the illumination which νοεῖν needs in order to see. Thus the illumination that which couples ὂν ᾗ ὄν and νοεῖν, the ζυγόν.
Ἀλήθεια now as a ζυγόν in the relation of the perceiver to the things encountered, and so ἀλήθεια itself constrained into the "yoke" of correctness.
Cf. Aristotle: the ἀληθεύειν τῆς ψυχῆς ["the unconcealing of the soul"]. Ἀλήθεια becomes accessibility; beings as such standing in the open; pathway for perception.
Thus the stages:
From ἀλήθεια (as φῶς) to ζυγόν.
From ζυγόν to ὁμοίωσις.
From ὁμοίωσις to veritas as rectitudo; at the same time, truth, i.e., the correctness of an assertion, is here grasped with respect to assertions and so as συμπλοκή ["connection"], connexio (Leibniz).
From rectitudo to certitudo, certainty of a conjunction (connexio?).
From certitudo to validity as objectivity.
From validity to effectivity.
Through the introduction of the ζυγόν, truth is apprehended, but in such a way that ἀλήθεια is thereby claimed to be both the unconcealedness of beings as beings and the domain of visibility for seeing and grasping. That means: inasmuch as a positing of correctness occurs, ἀλήθεια is laid down in that restricted double sense as the ground of