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§211 [334-335]

correctness and indeed in such a way that the ground is laid down only in the groundedness of what is posited by its insightfulness (on this ground). Therefore ὁμοίωσις is precisely still ἀλήθεια (or, to speak in the Greek manner, rests on this ground and essentially occurs in it as its essence) and so can and must still be called ἀλήθεια.

Subsequently, however, ἀλήθεια as such gets lost. All that remains as first and last is conformity, rectitudo, and within this determination an explanation of "correctness" must be sought out of the respective interpretation of the human being (as soul) and of beings, provided "correctness" is not altogether taken as purely and simply self-evident.


211. Ἀλήθεια
The crisis of its history in Plato and Aristotle, its last glimmering and complete collapse


1. Ἀλήθεια καὶ ὄν—unconcealedness, and specifically that of beings as such, in the Platonic sense of the ἰδέα; ἀλήθεια always on the side of ὄν; cf. the passages at the end of Book VI of the Republic.

2. The lighting up of beings as such; from beings themselves the lighting, the illumination, in which beings essentially occur. The illumination seen as coming from beings, insofar as beings are seen in terms of ἰδέα (at the same time, from the "α-" comes the "over and against").

3. As coming from there, whereto is the light cast? Toward what else than perception? And perception, for its part, occurs in moving toward beings, and this per-ception is possible only in the illumination and in traversing it. Thus it is the illumination—i.e., the ἰδέα itself as what is seen—which is the yoke, the ζυγόν, although that is characteristically never made explicit.

4. The yoke (i.e., truth understood as a yoke) is the preliminary form of truth as correctness inasmuch as the yoke is taken as that which couples and is not grasped and fathomed as the ground for the correspondence. In other words, ἀλήθεια is genuinely lost. There remains only the memory of the image of the "light" which is necessary for "seeing" (cf. the medieval lumen!).

Plato grasps ἀλήθεια as ζυγόν. On the basis of ζυγόν, however, ἀλήθεια can no longer be mastered; but the converse is indeed possible. The step toward ὁμοίωσις has thus been taken. The interpretation of the ζυγόν as ἀλήθεια is correct, but it must be recognized that ἀλήθεια itself is thereby interpreted in a definite respect and that a genuine questioning of ἀλήθεια is henceforth cut off.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger