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§213 [336-338]

The disavowal of all history rises up as the shifting of every occurrence into what can be made and arranged, something that first reveals itself fully in the fact that-without any relation and only in the manner of a doctrinal context-it concedes validity somewhere and somehow to some "providence" or "destiny."

Yet certainty as ego-certainty sharpens the interpretation of the human being as animal rationale. The result of this process is "personality," and even today many still believe, and would like to make others believe, that "personality" is the overcoming of egoity. In fact, it can only mask egoity.

What does it signify that Descartes still attempts to justify certainty itself as lumen naturale on tpe basis of the highest among beings as creatum creatoris?

What form does this nexus assume later on? In Kant, it occurs as the doctrine of the postulates! In German Idealism, as the absoluteness of the ego and of consciousness!

All of these forms are simply deeper-set (on a transcendental ground) reproductions of Descartes' course of thought: ego, ens finitum, causatum ab ente infinito.

On this path, the anthropomorphization of being and of its truth (ego-certainty of reason), already predetermined at the beginning, is ultimately raised into the absolute and thus seems to be overcome in the genuine sense. Yet everything here is the opposite of an overcoming and is in fact the deepest entanglement in the forgottenness of being (cf. The interplay, 90, 91. From the first to the other beginning).

Moreover, the ensuing era, from the middle of the nineteenth century on, does not even have knowledge of this effort of metaphysics. It sinks instead into the mere technique characteristic of the "theory of science" and in so doing appeals, not completely without justification, to Plato.

Neo-Kantianism: affirmed by the philosophy of "life" and the philosophy of "existence" ["Existenz"philosophie], because both (for example, Dilthey, and equally Jaspers) utterly fail to surmise what genuinely occurred in Western metaphysics and what must prepare itself as the necessity of the other beginning.


213. What the question of truth is about


1. It is not about a mere modification of the concept,

2. nor about a more original insight into the essence

3. Instead, it is about the leap into the essential occurrence of truth


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger