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V. The Grounding [349-350]

beings themselves and allow them to take effect in each case according to their own proper behest, in order that thereby the clearing may be grounded and not become an emptiness in which everything simply presents itself as equally easy to "understand" and master.

The self-concealing protrudes through the clearing, and only if that happens, i.e., only if the conflictual in its intimacy reigns throughout the "there," can the dislodgment from the indeterminate (and, as such, not at all grasped) domain of representation and lived experience succeed and can steadfastness in Da-sein be attempted.

Only if self-concealing reigns throughout all realms of production, creation, action, and sacrifice by weaving them together in essential occurrence, and if self-concealing determines the clearing and thus at the same time essentially occurs by encountering what secludes itself within the clearing, only then does world arise and at the same time (out of the "simultaneity" of beyng and beings) the earth springs up. Now for a moment there is history.

Therefore truth is never merely clearing; it essentially occurs as concealment just as originarily and intimately along with the clearing. These, clearing and concealment are not two; instead, they constitute the essential occurrence of the one truth itself. Inasmuch as truth essentially occurs, comes to be, the event becomes truth. The event eventuates, which means nothing else but that it and only it becomes truth, becomes that which belongs to the event, so that truth is precisely and essentially the truth of beyng.

Every questioning of truth that does not think so far in advance does not think far enough in advance.

Even that very different, medieval interpretation of verum as a determination of ens (beings), an interpretation which moves in the domain of the guiding question (metaphysics) and is in addition uprooted from its most proximate Greek soil, is still a semblance of this intimacy between truth and beyng. All the same, this questioning of the event should not be confused with that quite distinct relation between beings (ens) and representedness in the intellectus divinus, a relation which is built entirely on the ground of truth as the correctness of representation (intellectus) and which can be valid at all only under the presupposition that omne ens (Deus creator excepted) is ens creatum. At the same time, seen "ontologically," even Deus is grasped here on the basis of creatio, whereby it is manifest that this sort of "philosophy" takes its orientation from the account of creation in the Old Testament. Insight into this nexus, however, is all the more essential inasmuch as such a nexus is still maintained ubiquitously in modern metaphysics, even where the medieval directedness toward the "deposit of faith" of the Church has been abandoned long ago as


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger