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§232 [358-359]


Therefore no one ventures to pursue the meditation far enough, even within this basic position, so as to see that we "have" nothing more "given" which could be what is true by way of rendering and forming an image.

Even if only this much would be conceded, the question would already have to arise as to whether correctness (which has first grounded, and not presupposed, such a representation of beings and even of the one who does the representing), as the essence of truth, can at all ground and determine the search for what is true and the claim to it.

Furthermore, such a correctness would never lead out of the plight of the abandonment by being; it would only corroborate and call up the plight anew, in a veiling way.

But what does it mean that the essential projection of truth as clearing concealment must now be ventured and the dislodging of the human being into Da-sein prepared?

Dis-lodged out of that situation in which we find ourselves: in the gigantic emptiness and desolation, compelled into the tradition (which has become unrecognizable as such) without standards and above all without the will to interrogate them. The desolation, however, the concealed abandonment by being.



231. How truth, ἀλήθεια, becomes correctness


Truth, ἀλήθεια, scarcely sounds forth when it becomes correctness; indeed, truth remains powerful, but it is ungrounded and also not genuinely grounding.

Correctness gives priority to the ψυχή and then to the subject-object relation. The dominance of correctness already has its long history; therefore its provenance and the possibility of an alternative can be brought to sight only slowly and with difficulty. The concept of ψυχή already implies λόγος: originally as gathering and then as speech and saying.

That the assertion becomes the locus of "truth" is one of the strangest occurrences in the history of truth, although for us it seems perfectly ordinary.

Therefore the most difficult task, apart from grasping the essential occurrence itself, is to seek and preserve, in an originary way and where we do not at all suspect them, truth and what is true.

This uprooting of truth is accompanied by the veiling of the essence of beyng.

To what extent is "correctness" essential with respect to instituting and sheltering (i.e., with respect to language)?


232. The question of truth as historical meditation


That is not to be taken in the sense of a historiological report on the opinions and theories which have been put forward with regard to the "concept" of truth.

Philosophy in the other beginning is essentially historical, and in that respect a more originary kind of recollection of the history of the first beginning must also arise now.

The question is: which basic movements of the essence of truth, and of the interpretative conditions of truth, have borne Western history and will bear that history?


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger