§234 [360-361]

position, then we can indirectly fathom what it means to establish truth as ἀλήθεια for the first time in thought, to unfold and ground it in its essence. The fact that this not only did not but could not occur in all of previous metaphysics or even in the first beginning.

5. The grounding of the essence of truth as an uncovering of its first glimmering in ἀλήθεια is then not simply an appropriation of the word and of its fitting translation, "unconcealedness." Instead, what is required is an experience of the essence of truth as clearing for self-concealing.

The clearing concealment must ground itself as Da-sein

The self-concealing must come into knowledge as the essential occurrence of beyng itself as event.

In its turning, the most intimate relation between beyng and Dasein becomes visible as that which compels the basic question and makes it obligatory to go beyond the guiding question and thereby beyond all metaphysics, actually beyond and into the temporality-spatiality of the "there."

6. In accord with its long history and confused tradition in which various factors have intersected, "truth" itself and its concept are now no longer questioned in any clear and necessary way. Consequently, even the interpretations of the history of the concept of truth, and the interpretations of the cave allegory in particular, are paltry and are dependent on what was itself derived earlier from Platonism and from the doctrine of judgment. The basic positions are lacking for a projection of what is said in the cave allegory and of what is involved in that saying.

Therefore, it is necessary to layout, first of all and for the first time, an interpretation of the cave allegory which is complete and is rooted in the question of truth. Furthermore, that interpretation must be made effective as an introduction to the domain of the question of truth and as a guide to the necessity of that question. Of course, reservations are attached to such an immediate attempt, since the ground and line of sight for the projection of the interpretation and of its steps remain presupposed and will appear violent and arbitrary as long as they are left undiscussed.

234. The question of truth (Nietzsche)

The last one who asked the question of "truth," and asked about it most passionately, is Nietzsche. On the one hand, he proceeds from the fact

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger