§234 [363-364]

It certainly does appear that Nietzsche, in spite of everything, has incorporated also the essence of truth back into "life." But did he gain clarity about the truth regarding this postulation of "life" and thus of the will to power and of the eternal recurrence of the same? In his own way, very much so; for he understands these projections of beings as experiments we make with "truth." This philosophy is supposed to help assure the continuance of "life" as such, indeed precisely by liberating "life" in its unsurpassable possibilities. Here Nietzsche's thinking probably takes a step whose extent we still cannot judge, because we are too close to him and are therefore compelled to see everything still too exclusively in that particular horizon (the one of "life") which Nietzsche ultimately wanted to overcome. It thus becomes a matter of even greater necessity for us to question more originarily and thus precisely not fall victim to the erroneous view that Nietzsche's own questioning is thereby "done for."

What is made very difficult and almost impossible by Nietzsche's most proper thinking is the insight that the essential occurrence of truth means Da-sein, i.e., standing in the midst of the clearing of what is self-concealing and drawing thence the ground and power of being human. For, despite the evocations of "perspectivism," "truth" remains rolled up in "life," with life itself taken, almost in the manner of a thing, as a center of will and of power which wills its own enhancement and surmounting.

That transported standing out into the unknown, which certainly was a basic experience for Nietzsche, could not, if my view is correct, become the grounded core of his questioning, because the tradition held him ensnared in the three-fold way mentioned above (p. 286).

Accordingly, Nietzsche was not at first grasped on the basis of the most hidden volition of his thinking and for a long time to come will not be grasped in that way. Instead, he is placed within the usual horizons of the dominant thinking and the worldviews of the nineteenth century, so that by being set off in relief against them, and thus with their help, what is proper to Nietzsche and "new" with him can be found and made useful.

The way the confrontation with Nietzsche does master and does not master his conception of "truth" must become a cornerstone for the decision as to whether we are helping his genuine philosophy to its future (without becoming "Nietzscheans") or are simply pigeonholing it in the manner of "historiology."

Nietzsche seems to inquire deepest into the essence of truth when he asks, "What is the meaning of all will to truth?" and when he calls

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger