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V. The Grounding [367-368]

236. Truth


Why is there truth? Is there indeed truth? How? If truth were not, on what would stand even the mere possibility of the "why"? Does the why-question already confirm the fact that there is truth, that truth must be in some way or other? Questioning as seeking the ground out of which and on which truth is supposed to be. Whence this questioning? Is it not based on a bursting forth of human beings into an open realm which opens itself so as to conceal? And is not this, the clearing-concealment, the essence of truth? But whence and how does there take place the bursting forth of human beings into that "other" which they take themselves to be, which appears to humans as their domain, but which they themselves actually are not, which is instead debarred and disguised to humans and of which only a semblance remains to them (Da-sein)?

The determination of the essence of truth as clearing-concealment—on what is that grounded? On a clue given by ἀλήθεια. But who has ever thought through ἀλήθεια in a determining way, and whence the rights to ἀλήθεια as something handed down and yet at the same time forgotten? How do we gain a stance in the essence of truth? Without this stance, everything "true" is a mere fraud. Nothing is to be won here by fleeing into the close-to-life reality of a very questionable "life."

How is this to be brought closer to the mode of representation usual today? In this regard, various preparatory ways can be taken, even if the surest way seems to be to abandon the entire previous domain in which space and time have been represented and conceptualized and attempt to start afresh. But that is not possible, since the issue here is not at all the mere modification of representation and of the directionality of representation; rather, what is called for is a dislodging of the essence of the human being into Da-sein. Questioning and thinking must indeed be inceptual, but they must still be precisely transitional (cf. The interplay).

The obvious course is to investigate whether it is not the case that in the question, "Why is there truth?," truth can be unfolded as the ground of the "why" and thus determined in its essence.

Yet the question does indeed seem to be already bound—indeterminately, confusedly, and ordinarily enough—to a knowledge of "truth," so as to make problematic again the question of whether an appeal to such knowledge and opinion can be borne out.

Where will we then be tottering if we renounce appearances and what is common?

What if we nevertheless came into the nearness of the event, which might be obscured in its essence but still does show that a "between" essentially occurs between us and beyng and that this "between" itself belongs to the essential occurrence of beyng?