this questioning of being is overpowered by beings not only in its beginning (which is the reason for the disempowerment of φύσις and ἀλήθεια) but also that this priority of beings extends throughout the history of metaphysics, as essential to metaphysics, can be seen most strikingly where the question of being was carried out in the purest way since the time of the Greeks, namely, in Kant. The postulation of experience as the only normative domain of beings is in unity with the disclosure of the transcendental. Beingness as the "condition of the possibility" of the object of experience and experience itself are for their part conditioned by the priority of beings as the norm for what is supposed to count as being [Sein]. In Kant's transcendental questioning, beings ("nature") are indeed seen in the light of Newtonian physics, but they are intended metaphysically (in terms of metaphysical history) in the sense of the φύσει ὄν and ultimately in the sense of φύσις. Absolute idealism seems to overcome the priority of beings, for the exclusive determination of the object on the basis of objectivity (i.e., the elimination of the "thing-in-itself") signifies nothing other than the establishment of the priority of beingness over beings. Therefore, it is indeed impossible, for instance, to follow Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit precisely in its beginning ("sense certainty") unless the incorporation of the sensible object into the actuality of absolute spirit is already thought in advance and absolutely. What else could this mean but that beings have lost their priority over being? This interpretation would nevertheless amount to a downright misunderstanding of idealism, for even idealism adheres to the priority of beings over beingness and merely covers over this relation while seeming to reverse it. Every objectivity, on every one of its levels, is indeed determined on the basis of the absolute. Yet objectivity as such is already, according to its essence (passing over in silence its provenance from the historicality of being), not only related to the object but also determined from the object as from a determinate interpretation of beings on the basis of a starting point within beings themselves. Through sublation into absolute knowledge, objectivity seems to disappear, but it is merely extended into the objectivity of self-consciousness and of reason. Precisely this, that beingness is grounded in absolute subjectivity, shows very well that this being, the subjectum, as relational center of all representing to oneself, decides over beingness, over what can pertain to beingness, as well as over the levels and essential forms of representedness. Thus we see that absolute idealism (versus the Greeks) accords an even greater priority to beings over beingness, inasmuch as beyng is determined on the basis of the subject, which means, at the same time, on the basis of the object. In terms of the historicality of being,